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Abstract
As automation proliferates and algorithms become increasingly responsible for high-stakes
decision-making, AI agents face moral dilemmas in fields ranging from market design to
robots. For instance, should a self-driving car swerve into a barrier, endangering its pas-
sengers, to avoid colliding with a jaywalker? Technology companies, governments, and all
AI practitioners must build and maintain autonomous systems that make responsible moral
decisions.
Prior approaches to automated moral decision-making utilize either rules-based game the-
oretic models or machine learning models trained on crowd-sourced data. But rules-based
systems are difficult to adapt to new moral dilemmas and data, and sourcing high quality, rep-
resentative, hand-labeled data for machine learning is costly and even harmful if the labels are
biased. To lower the barrier to training moral agents, I develop a heuristic-based weak learning
approach to moral decision-making.
My approach synthesizes potentially conflicting legal, philosophical, and domain-specific
heuristics to inexpensively and automatically label training data for moral dilemmas. Rather
than attempting to survey a representative sample of users who may be unable to make in-
formed decisions about complex dilemmas, this approach relies on a smaller sample of domain
experts. By writing heuristic functions over the dataset, these experts efficiently specify ethical
principles for technical dilemmas. Weak learning paves the way to a ubiquitous, transparent
method for instilling moral decision-making in the machine learning pipeline.
As a proof-of-concept, I test this approach in two case studies for which there is publicly
available data on people’s moral preferences: 1) the Moral Machine trolley problem, in which
an autonomous vehicle must choose to save only one group of characters; 2) a kidney exchange,
in which a market clearing algorithm must choose between two potential matches for a donor
kidney. I show that in these domains, heuristic-based weak learning is quicker and easier than
fully supervised learning and achieves comparable performance. I also identify patterns of
disagreement between heuristics and individual respondents.
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Figure 1: What should the self-driving car do? An example moral dilemma from the Moral
Machine interface [Mor]. Staying on course would result in the death of two women, a female
athlete, a young girl, and an elderly woman. Swerving would result in the death of two men,
a male athlete, a young boy, and an elderly man. This scenario was designed to elicit moral
preferences about gender.
1 Introduction
As the widespread application of artificial intelligence (AI) systems grows, so does the discov-
ery of serious fairness and bias issues in AI applications from face recognition to the hiring
process. Algorithms are increasingly faced with morally ambiguous decisions: for instance,
should a self-driving car should swerve into a barrier, killing its passengers, to avoid killing
a jaywalker (Figure 1)? In the kidney exchange market, should a clearing-house algorithm
allocate kidneys to patients who drink less, all else equal? AI is already used to make life-and-
death decisions in the kidney exchange, and autonomous vehicles are already being tested in
cities. Technology companies, governments, and all AI practitioners are currently faced with
the problem of easily building and maintaining algorithms that make moral decisions, given
the wide variety of applications and moral considerations that exist in the wild.
Prior approaches to moral AI leverage crowdsourcing to develop ethical models that mimic
popular moral preferences. For example, the Moral Machine project collected human judg-
ments of autonomous vehicle (AV) behavior in trolley dilemmas, including the jaywalking
example [Awad et al., 2018]. Noothigattu et al. [2018] developed a computational model for
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profiling the moral preferences of these respondents and constructing a voting system for mak-
ing collective moral decisions at runtime. Survey results are good for measuring moral pref-
erences in specific cases, but may not provide useful ethical guidance in complicated domains
and often run into selection bias.
To improve the process of eliciting and operationalizing moral principles, I develop a
framework for quickly generating training data for moral dilemmas based on a set of ad-
justable moral heuristics, as determined by a priori ethical or legal principles. Rather than
attempting to survey a representative sample of users who are potentially unable to make in-
formed decisions about the domain in question, my approach seeks to collect decision-making
heuristics from a smaller sample of domain experts. With empirical data for two use cases
(the autonomous vehicle trolley problem and the kidney exchange) I show that constructing
heuristics is cheaper, quicker, and easier than collecting votes or rankings over individual sets
of alternatives but provides comparable performance. I also show that if experts tend to share
heuristics, a ranked-choice vote can be used to weight heuristics by their popularity; in the
kidney exchange, this approach outperforms a fully-supervised approach.
Section 2 details major problems for automated ethical decision-making, and Section 3
describes various attempts to solve them. Section 4 presents my approach, which I test with
two different case studies: the autonomous vehicle trolley dilemma and the kidney exchange
dilemma (Section 5). The remaining sections conclude and point to important future work.
2 Problem Statement
The field of algorithmic ethics has a long history and a broad set of problems [Moor, 1985].
This paper deals in particular with moral dilemmas, scenarios in which an agent faced with
multiple alternatives is morally compelled to choose each, but can only choose one [Sinnott-
Armstrong, 1988, Yu et al., 2018]. For instance, an autonomous vehicle in the Moral Machine
problem is morally compelled to save both the passengers and the pedestrians, but due to brake
failure or some other physical constraint must choose which group to save. Formally, let A be
a finite set of possible alternatives, where each alternative is represented by a vector of relevant
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moral or situational features. An instance of a moral dilemma consists of a set of alternatives
X ∈ A of size K such that a moral agent is compelled to choose (not choose) each alternative
but must choose only one. An answer to the dilemma takes the form of an ordinal ranking y
over X which ranks the moral appeal of each alternative.
In addition to the trolley dilemma for autonomous vehicles, there are many scenarios in
which an automated agent or algorithm may face a moral dilemma, especially when inter-
acting with human beings: when two matches for a donor kidney are found, which patient
should receive the kidney? Is a repentant convict more deserving of parole than an unrepentant
one? Should an advertising algorithm consider the moral impacts of particular advertisements
on particular users? Moral dilemmas are usually reserved for human judgment, but as algo-
rithms are endowed with more and more responsibility in human affairs, they will inevitably
face moral dilemmas that are either too immediate, too minute, or too complicated to be left
to human judgment. As a result, some researchers have called for a general framework for
automated moral decision-making [Conitzer et al., 2017].
There are several important problems to solve when automating ethical decision-making.
(1) To specify a moral dilemma, researchers must choose a representation of all relevant con-
siderations, or features, for each alternative. In the Moral Machine experiment, features include
inter alia age, gender, and class status. Features must be specific enough to convey meaningful
information about the moral factors at play, but general enough to be decipherable by a domain
expert or a layperson for coding or training the model. Oversimplification of the problem into
only a few moral features, as is often necessary in experiments intended to measure moral
preferences, may miss crucial factors that should influence decision-making. (2) The moral
agent must learn or operate according to semantic knowledge of moral principles or prefer-
ences. (3) In the absense of clear moral consensus, the agent must be pluralistic; that is, it must
reconcile multiple moral principles or preferences. (4) The moral agent’s decisions should be
interpretable. If the agent has moral responsibility, there must be a way to account for its de-
cisions to affected users, for ethical and regulatory reasons. For this reason, the use of black
box models for moral decision-making is somewhat unappealing unless the model is made
sufficiently interpretable [Du et al., 2018]. Section 3 reviews some contemporary solutions to
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these problems and their shortcomings.
3 Related Work
The problem of moral AI has been approached in two primary ways. In the “top-down” ap-
proach, moral principles are encoded in the algorithmic agent, generally with a short or ex-
tensive form game [Dehghani et al., 2008a, Anderson and Anderson, 2014, Blass and Forbus,
2015]. In the “bottom-up” approach, the agent learns to distinguish moral and immoral behav-
ior from user data [Kim et al., 2018, Noothigattu et al., 2018, Kahng et al., 2019, Freedman
et al., 2020]. In their call for a general framework for algorithmic ethical decision-making,
Conitzer et al. [2017] suggest that by abstracting moral principles from individual moral pref-
erences, whether through a manually encoded decision-making framework or learned prefer-
ences, AI models may result in a more consistent system than that of any individual. But to
achieve consistency, moral algorithms must generalize or aggregate many, sometimes conflict-
ing, moral principles.
There is disagreement about what kinds of moral principles should be encoded in agents
[Shulman et al., 2009], and moral principles tend to vary from culture to culture [Dehghani
et al., 2008b]. In ethics, moral principles usually include three dimensions: consequentialist
ethics, in which an agent weighs utilitarian consequences across all alternatives; deontologi-
cal ethics, in which an agent acts in accordance with established norms or duties; and virtue
ethics, in which an agent attempts to embody intrinsic moral values such as fairness [Cointe
et al., 2016]. The “top-down” solution to this problem is to construct a self-consistent moral
framework under one of these views, or to allow one particular moral principle to supersede the
rest. Some combination of these elements of ethical behavior may be combined to form an ex-
tensive form game [Conitzer et al., 2017, Cointe et al., 2016]. Even if one consistent approach
is selected, or ethical principles are arranged such that conflicts are resolved by referencing a
hierarchy, the same ethical principle may give rise to conflicting alternatives, creating a sym-
metrical dilemma as in Sophie’s Choice [Sinnott-Armstrong, 1988, Greenspan, 1983]. A few
researchers now advocate for models with built-in moral uncertainty, in which multiple moral
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decision-making frameworks operate simultaneously, either disjunctively or probabilistically
Bogosian [2017], Martinho et al. [2020]. In the “bottom-up” (crowd-sourcing) paradigm, un-
certainty is baked in: observed or simulated dilemmas are presented to human annotators, who
choose the morally correct alternative according to their own sense of ethics. Usually, social
computational choice models [Noothigattu et al., 2018], or another form of general prefer-
ence measurement [Kim et al., 2018, Freedman et al., 2020], are applied to combine these
responses according to some egalitarian voting rule. Machine learning models generalize be-
yond the training set with accuracy, while a top-down approach might struggle to adapt to new
variations on a dilemma. The “bottom-up approach” takes the view that in the absence of a
consensus philosophical theory, using psychological studies to measure “folk” intuitions may
be the best way to ethically constrain algorithms [Bello and Bringsjord, 2013].
In fact, both the “top-down” and “bottom-up” paradigms rely on empirical data in practice,
either to measure the prevailing opinion amongst experts or the collective preferences of reg-
ular users. Moral dilemmas are often used by psychologists to measure subjects’ preferences
with respect to some through pairwise comparisons [Awad et al., 2020, Bonnefon et al., 2016].
In “bottom-up” frameworks, these moral preferences can be easily converted to a decision-
making rule through a simple ranking system or a more complex hierarchical model [Freed-
man et al., 2020, Kim et al., 2018]. In “top-down” frameworks, abstract moral principles can
be combined to create an a priori “meta-ethical” framework for decision-making. The mix of
principles may be determined by either the preponderance of philosophers or domain experts
sharing a particular moral precept or based on the special applicability of a particular moral
precept to a given task [Macaskill, 2016, Bogosian, 2017]. For top-down approaches which
attempt to create meta-ethical frameworks, empirical measurement of expert opinion becomes
an important issue. Though empirical strategies like these take promising steps toward artifi-
cially intelligent moral decision-making, they require a democratized approach to ethics that
comes with distinct limitations.
But in the absence of high quality, crowd-sourced data on moral preferences, practitioners
often rely on Amazon Mechanical Turk or another less desirable survey method [Freedman
et al., 2020]. Social computational choice approaches attempt to aggregate these individual
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votes into a general model. In many cases, surveyed voters are not likely to representative
data: approximately 70% of Moral Machine respondents were male college graduates, and
most were from Western countries [Awad et al., 2018]. On Mechanical Turk, there are selection
biases towards females, lower-income individuals, though these biases may be less aggravated
than in traditional university studies [Paolacci et al., 2010]. Further, since moral preferences
tend to vary across cultures, cross-country data are sometimes necessary [Awad et al., 2018].
Worse, the representations used for these empirical studies are necessarily simple; a highly
complex or contingent representation of the moral dilemma may be difficult for human subjects
to parse, and simplifying the problem runs the risk of eliminating important interaction effects
between features. Poor survey design might lead respondents to emphasize moral features they
would not consider in a real-world scenario.
4 Approach
To address current shortcomings in moral AI, I turn to weakly supervised machine learning.
Section 3 details the difficult issues that face machine learning approaches to ethical frame-
works: namely, obtaining enough high-quality ground truth data from sufficiently qualified
individuals. Rather than attempt to measure moral preferences directly, I suggest collecting
moral principles directly from domain experts in the form of heuristic functions over a set of
example dilemmas. Heuristic functions are practical, usually simplistic, rules for determining
the right moral decision for a given dilemma. Heuristics may come from the experience of a
domain expert, or they may be sourced from legal or ethical principles by an expert in law or
philosophy. For example, the German Ethics Comission on Automated and Connected Driving
published a set of ethical rules that places the protection of human life above the protection of
other animal life [Luetge, 2017]. This law presents a clear heuristic for guiding ethical action
in autonomous vehicles: “always choose to protect human life over animal life.”1 Fairness met-
rics in equitable machine learning also tend to formalize and optimize for simple rules about
1It should be noted that the ethical commission also recommended banning distinctions on the basis of personal
features such as age Luetge [2017]. The selection of eligible features to represent a moral dilemma is an important
problem that is not solved in this paper.
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fairness, such as statistical parity [Dwork et al., 2011]. The advantage of this approach is that
it does not require experts to hand-label thousands of data points; instead, experts need only
write a sufficient number of heuristic labeling functions to represent their moral knowledge
about the domain in question.
My central hypothesis is that most relevant moral principles can be represented by heuristic
functions and that these heuristics can be used to label training data quickly and efficiently to
automate ethical decisions in complex domains. Under this assumption, good moral decision-
making depends on de-noising and aggregating each heuristic labeling function. I will leverage
the open-source “data programming” framework Snorkel [Ratner et al., 2017]. Data program-
ming is the programmatic creation of datasets based on weak supervision strategies, including
heuristic labeling and alignment with external knowledge bases (distant supervision) [Bach
et al., 2017]. Snorkel has been used to achieve significant gains in classifier performance by
high-profile users from Google and IBM to Stanford Medicine and the National Institutes of
Health [Ratner et al., 2017]. By producing training labels from noisy moral heuristics, I will
avoid the data collection barrier to moral AI while retaining the predictive advantages of ma-
chine learning. The following section defines the key components of the method.
Note that this approach does not solve the representation model for moral dilemmas. Each
moral alternative must be represented in a format that experts can understand, so granularity
and dimensionality are somewhat limited. However, so long as an expert has semantic knowl-
edge of at least some of the features, they can still provide a useful heuristic on a particular
subset of all the features considered. It is therefore possible to use a complex or hierarchical
representation so long as enough experts are consulted to provide meaningful heuristics for a
sufficient area of the feature space.
4.1 Pipeline
As a simple example, take the classic lifeboat dilemma: a ship is sinking, and its K passengers
must escape using a lifeboat which can only hold K − 1 people. Suppose the captain must
choose who should stay behind with the ship. To choose, he consults the ship manifest, which
contains the age, gender, occupation and ticket class of each passenger.
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Figure 2: A data programming pipeline for training a random forest classifier to make moral
decisions. Experts write heuristic functions based on domain knowledge which are used to
produce labels. Labels are synthesized with a generative model and used to train a classifier.
Let X be the set of scenarios in which there are K moral alternatives. (X is the set of all
K-combinations of the possible alternatives A.) If Xi ∈ X is one such scenario, let Xi,k be
the feature vector representing the kth moral alternative available to the agent in Xi. In the
lifeboat dilemma, Xi might be a voyage where all the passengers in the manifest are elderly
ladies except for the captain; Xi,k might represent the alternative where the captain chooses to
sacrifice himself.
In crowd-sourcing, survey respondents are asked to solve various instances of moral prob-
lems like the lifeboat dilemma. Suppose survey respondents are presented with a sample of
N scenarios X ⊆ X from the set of all possible scenarios. Rankings are collected from each
respondent for some or all of the sample scenarios; for instance, the jth survey respondent is
presented with the moral features the ship’s manifest Xi for a voyage and asked to provide a
moral ranking yi,j overXi. In the lifeboat dilemma, yi,j takes the form of a list of passengers in
order of how morally appropriate it would be for each to stay behind. Then, a fully supervised
classifier F is learned from the training set X and respondent rankings Y = {yi,j}.
In weak supervision, these crowd-sourced rankings are replaced by experts’ heuristics.
Rather than using a set of crowd-sourced rankings on individual scenarios to train F, I use the
open-source Snorkel framework [Sno] to generate probabilistic training labels Y˜ for a training
set without access to any “ground truth” rankings from experts (Figure 2):
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1. Define the heuristic moral principles as a set of M labeling functions Λ ⊆ {λ | λ :
X → Y}, where Y is the set of all possible rankings over scenarios in X . Each heuristic
λm takes a scenarioXi as input and outputs a heuristic ranking yˆi,m over the alternatives.
As an example, an honorable captain might use the heuristic “leave behind passengers
in order of descending rank, starting with the captain.” (For more on the process of
constructing heuristic labeling functions, see Section 4.2.) Then Λ(X)N×M is a matrix
of heuristic labels such that Λi,m = λm(Xi) = yˆi,m ∀ Xi ∈ X, λm ∈ Λ.
2. Estimate the accuracies, correlations, and inter-dependencies of the black-box (for the
purposes of estimation) labeling functions Λ by learning a generative model to produce
a single probabilistic label for each scenario Xi. Since training labels are probabilistic,
let Y˜ = {y˜i,k} be a set of probabilistic rankings denoting the true probability of choosing
any alternative Xi,k given Xi (with the stipulation that
∑K
k=1 y˜i,k = 1). In this paper,
we consider only the case where K = 2 (there are only two alternatives), so Y˜ is just
the set of probabilities {y˜i,1} of selecting the first of two alternatives in each Xi. In the
lifeboat dilemma, K = 2 implies there are only two passengers; Y˜ then contains the
probabilities of choosing the first passenger in the manifest for all the possible voyages
in X . The generative model aggregates the label matrix Λ(X) into probabilistic labels
Y˜ | X by estimating weights for each of the heuristic labeling functions. The structure
of this model is described in Section 4.3.
3. Train a discriminative model F to predict Y˜ | X . A wide variety of traditional classifiers,
including deep learning models, may be used for F. The choice of classifier depends on
the domain.
Crucially, the true accuracies of each labeling function are not known in advance. (In the
lifeboat example, there is no guarantee that the captain’s strategy of sacrificing himself will
always be the morally appropriate choice; on a prison boat, he may choose to sacrifice a con-
victed murderer instead.) Unless there is exogenous data about the success of each heuristic,
their accuracies must be learned, unsupervised, in Step 2. In some lucky cases, there may be
data about the quality of a given heuristic. For example, heuristics built to express the view-
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points of the various broad ethical theories (deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics) may
be specified by a study of the share of ethicists who hold each viewpoint, with some adjustment
to account for abstentions and correlations [Bourget and Chalmers, 2014]. (A study may find
that 90% of ethicists agree with the captain’s self-sacrificing heuristic; then this heuristic may
be a priori assigned a higher weight than a more controversial heuristic.) I explore a similar
approach with the kidney exchange example in Section 5.2.
4.2 Heuristic Functions
Definition
A heuristic, or labeling, function λ is a simplistic rule for making a moral decision given a set
of alternatives Xi. When faced with only two alternatives, the heuristic function is just a black
box classifier which takes the concatenation of Xi,1 and Xi,2 as its input and outputs a binary
classification yˆi. Some example labeling functions are provided in Section 5. This approach
treats each labeling function as an individual “voter” voting on each alternative in Xi. Since
heuristics express only incomplete strategies for decision-making, labeling functions have the
option to abstain from voting. The coverage of a labeling function is the proportion of scenarios
for which the labeling function does not abstain; its polarity is the frequency at which it outputs
each label (some heuristics never output a particular alternative). If there are ground-truth
labels available to form a development set D ⊆ X, then a heuristic’s accuracy is the proportion
of true positives in λ(D) based on the crowd-sourced labels Y. Other metrics (e.g. F1 score)
should be used if the frequencies of choosing various alternatives are unbalanced.
Workflow
I used the following workflow to construct heuristic functions for the use cases in Section 5:
1. Review philosophical literature, legal regulations, and example scenarios to create a list
of potential heuristics.
2. Write a prototype version of the heuristic function.
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3. Assess polarity, coverage and accuracy for each labeling function. If absolutely no
ground-truth labels are available to assess accuracy, create and label just a few unit tests
by hand. Examine false positives and false negatives to check for bugs and edge cases.
4. Refine the heuristic function and repeat 3 until the function adequately expresses the
abstract heuristic.
Implementation
In this study, I use Python functions to code heuristics, but any platform may implement a
heuristic. Though this study is only a proof-of-concept, it is important to note that in practice,
the use of a programming language may limit the representativeness of heuristics collected;
if the only experts consulted are those who know Python, the heuristics obtained will likely
be skewed. Likewise, if the interface for providing heuristics is exceedingly complicated or
requires English language skills, individuals without a formal education or who are not na-
tive speakers may not be qualified as experts, not by virtue of their moral expertise, but by
virtue of their backgrounds. Some level of abstraction and translation, manual or automated,
is necessary to collect moral heuristics from experts of all backgrounds.
Creating heuristics also requires a minimal process of tuning and refining to achieve good
results (Steps 3 & 4 in the heurstic development workflow). Ratner et al. [2017] demonstrate
the importance of training experts to write and evaluate their heuristic functions and were able
to train several experts with education levels ranging from B.S. to Ph.D. and prior coding
experience to write heuristic functions in a two-day workshop. For a classification problem in
the field of bioinformatics, these users achieved better accuracy scores than hand-labelers on
Mechanical Turk with only around 10 heuristic functions [Ratner et al., 2017].
4.3 Generative Model
To de-noise experts’ moral heuristics, we use the generative model proposed by Bach et al.
[2017]. The true preferred alternative y is a latent variable in a probabilistic model, where
the “votes” of each heuristic λm are noisy signals. The generative model, a factor graph for
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estimating the heuristic weights w, is defined as follows:
pw(Λ, Y ) = Z
−1
w exp
(
N∑
i=1
wTφi(Λ, yi)
)
(1)
where Zw is a normalizing constant and Λ is the heuristic label matrix. φi(Λ, Y ) is a concate-
nated vector containing factors for labeling propensity, accuracy, and pairwise correlations:
φLabi,j = 1{Λi,j 6= ∅} (2)
φAcci,j = 1{Λi,j = yi} (3)
φCorri,j,k = 1{Λi,j = Λi,k} (j, k) ∈ C (4)
Label propensity is the estimated likelihood that a heuristic provides a label for any given
data point; label accuracy is the estimated likelihood that its label matches the ground-truth
label; label correlations model the dependencies between labeling functions, which are not
necessarily independent. C is the set of potential correlations (pairs of labeling functions). For
m labeling functions, w ∈ R2m+|C|.
The objective function for unsupervised learning minimizes negative log marginal likeli-
hood pw(Λ) conditional on Λ:
wˆ = argmin
w
(
− log
∑
Y
pw(Λ, Y )
)
(5)
which yields predictions Y˜ = pwˆ(Y |Λ). Since y is latent, only the marginal likelihood pw(Λ)
can be used to estimate the weights wˆ. For computational efficiency, the objective function can
be expressed as the marginal pseudolikelihood of a single labeling function Λj conditioned on
the outputs of the others Λ¬j , with l1 regularization:
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wˆ = argmin
w
(
− log pw(Λj |Λ¬j) + ||w||1
)
(6)
= argmin
w
(
−
m∑
i=1
log
∑
yi
pw(Λi,j , yi|Λi,¬j) + ||w||1
)
(7)
where  > 0. Snorkel minimizes by interleaving stochastic gradient descent steps and Gibbs
sampling steps [Ratner et al., 2017], an approach similar to contrastive divergence [Hinton,
2002].
There are some cases in which a simple majority voter is better specified for label genera-
tion than this model. (In a majority labeling model, the output of each heuristic is a “vote” for
that moral alternative. The alternative with the most votes is the final label; ties are broken ran-
domly.) When label density (average coverage across all labeling functions) is sufficiently high
or sufficiently low, a majority voter performs just as well as the generative model. In low den-
sity settings (few data points have multiple votes), the number of conflicts between heuristics
is lower and an egalitarian voting schema is negligibly worse. In high-density settings, assum-
ing average labeling function accuracy is better than random, Ratner et al. [2017] prove that
majority voting converges exponentially to an optimal solution with label density. In practical
terms, the generative model is most appropriate when the domain is not hyper-specific (experts
only have very specific moral expertise) and not hyper-general (experts provide heuristics with
very high coverage).
5 Experiments
I construct a proof-of-concept implementation of this approach to demonstrate its application
to real-world ethical dilemmas. I evaluate my approach on pairwise (K = 2) moral prefer-
ence data from surveys conducted in two domains: autonomous vehicles (Section 5.1) and
the kidney exchange (Section 5.2). To approximate a real-world data programming work-
flow, I assumed the surveyed users to be domain experts and used the survey results to write
a set of heuristic functions for each domain. Heuristics are combined into a single label for
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each data point using either the generative labeler or a majority voting labeler (Section 4.3).
I then compare the performance of a machine learning model trained on the labeler output
(a weakly supervised classifier) to a model trained on the ground-truth user survey data (a
fully supervised classifier) and benchmark my approach against prior models. All heuristic
functions, data, and code used to produce the figures in this paper are available at https:
//github.com/ryansteed/heuristic-moral-machine.
5.1 Autonomous Vehicle Trolley Problem
In the autonomous vehicle domain, Awad et al. [2018] explore the classic trolley problem in
a modern context. Through the Moral Machine website [Mor], the authors collected 40 mil-
lion moral decisions from 233 countries and territories for the following scenario: imagine
an autonomous vehicle suffers brake failure just before a crosswalk and must choose whether
to collide with the pedestrians or swerve into a barrier and crash (Figure 1). What should
the self-driving car do? In the Moral Machine interface, each respondent is presented a set
of 13 unavoidable accident dilemmas with only two possible actions: to stay on course or to
swerve. Each dilemma presents a set of characters, pedestrians or passengers, designed to test
moral preferences across the following dimensions: saving humans (versus pets), staying on
course (versus swerving), saving passengers (versus pedestrians), saving more lives (versus
fewer lives), saving men (versus women), saving young people (versus the elderly), saving
law-abiding pedestrians (versus jaywalkers), saving the fit, and saving those with higher social
status. Additional characters include criminals, pregnant women, and doctors. Some dilem-
mas isolate a particular feature (e.g. gender) and hold all other factors constant, as in Figure
1. Other dilemmas contain a random mix of moral decision-making factors. For each partici-
pant, all the alternatives presented are randomly generated and are nearly unique; each unique
alternative tested is included an average of 2.3 respondent surveys.
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Figure 3: A binary matrix for decomposing Moral Machine characters into abstract moral
features. Black squares indicates a positive mapping from character to abstract moral feature.
Figure from Kim et al. [2018].
5.1.1 Data
Awad et al. [2018] published a set of over 18 million pairwise comparisons obtained from over
1.3 million respondents. So that the data collected will be balanced over each moral dimension
and the responses of users fully explored, this experiment considers only votes from complete
13-dilemma sessions. This subset includes 1,544,920 moral decisions from 51,211 unique
respondents. Respondents are concentrated mostly in the United States and Europe.
Formally, each moral alternative in a any scenario X can be represented as a vector of
integer features Φ. The vector contains an integer representing the quantity of each character
saved by choosing this alternative, along with several other features describing the alternative:
a binary variable denoting whether the car is swerving (that is, whether an algorithmic inter-
vention has occurred); a binary variable indicating whether the pedestrians have a red light,
a green light, or no crossing signal whatsoever; and a binary variable indicating whether the
characters saved in this alternative are passengers. To simplify the problem, I follow Kim et al.
[2018] in decomposing the full feature vector Φ into the simplified morally abstracted vector
Θ with a linear mapping F : Φ → Θ. F (Φ) = BΦ, where B is the binary matrix shown
in Figure 3. For the Moral Machine dilemma, each scenario Xi is represented by a pair of
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@labeling_function()
def utilitarian(x):
"""Save the most human lives."""
saved_by_int = x['intervention']['Human']
saved_by_no_int = x['no_intervention']['Human']
return argmax([saved_by_int, saved_by_no_int])
Figure 4: A simple utilitarian heuristic in Python using the Snorkel labeling function interface.
The function takes as input a dataframe with abstract feature vectors for each alternative (in-
tervention or no intervention by the moral AV) and chooses the alternative that saves the most
human lives.
abstract moral feature vectors (Φ0,Φ1)i. Let Φ0 be the alternative that results from the au-
tonomous vehicle staying on course. Thus the j-th survey respondent’s moral decision yi,j is
a binary variable, 0 for Φ0 and 1 for Φ1.
5.1.2 Heuristics
The goal of the remainder of this section is to provide a set of heuristics for determining Y˜
and to compare decision-making models trained on Y˜ to models trained on the “ground-truth”
labelsY. For the sake of comparison, I assume that pairwise comparisons collected through the
Moral Machine website reflect expert opinions about morality in the Moral Machine problem.
Mirroring the cross-cultural preferences estimated by Awad et al. [2018], I wrote a set of 16
functions expressing heuristics for statistically significant global moral preferences (e.g. “save
doctors” and “do not hit the pedestrians if they are crossing legally”). An example labeling
function expressing a utilitarian principle is listed in Figure 4. Heuristics were debugged using
a held-out development partition of 25,527 (20%) responses from the test set.
Heuristic Accuracy. To evaluate the heuristic functions, I partitioned the training set of
Moral Machine responses again to obtain a validation set with 106,105 responses, 20% of the
training set. It takes only seconds to label or abstain from every data point in the validation
set. When do survey respondents tend to agree with each heuristic? Henceforth, I will call
this measure “accuracy,” since the human responses are treated as ground-truth for the sake of
comparison. Figure 5 shows each heuristic’s individual accuracy in each scenario type tested
by the Moral Machine website. As expected, heuristics pertaining directly to the given scenario
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tend to perform best, such as the “save youth” heuristic in scenarios where the agent is asked
to choose between a group of young and old people. In scenarios where the characters are
generated randomly, the “sacrifice criminals” and “sacrifice pets” heuristics received a notably
higher consensus than other heuristics, but less so for “sacrifice the homeless.”
5.1.3 Label Model
The next step is to aggregate the heuristic labels into a single predicted label for each scenario.
This particular use case is relatively high density (Figure 7), so we can expect the majority vot-
ing model and the generative model to perform equally well on a large number of data points.
In fact, I find that where majority voting labeler agrees with Moral Machine respondents 67.9%
of the time, the generative model agrees only 63.0% of the time.
Weight Estimation. Figure 6 shows the rates of agreement between each labeling function
and the pairwise preferences expressed by Moral Machine respondents. There is a clear trade-
off between coverage and accuracy; labeling functions that are more specific tend to perform
better (e.g. the heuristic “if an alternative saves only pets, choose the other”). However, the
“save females” function is a stand-out success, suggesting it may be a popular, widely applied
heuristic among respondents. Most importantly, Figure 6 reports the weights w estimated by
the generative model - there is a clear correlation between the coverage and accuracy of a
heuristic and its estimated weighting in the label synthesizer. For this data, the generative
model is capable of recognizing specific, accurate heuristics for this use case without access to
ground-truth labels.
Generative Model Accuracy. In addition to heuristic-specific accuracy scores, Figure 5
also shows the accuracy of the aggregate decision produced by the generative label model.
Human respondents tend to agree with the generative model most when the dilemma is between
pets and humans (“Species”) and when the dilemma is between saving more lives and saving
fewer lives (“Utilitarian”). Notably, the accuracy of the heuristic model is highest for those
scenarios with the highest effect sizes, as measured in the Moral Machine experiment [Awad
et al., 2018]. In other words, the heuristic model tends to agree with human respondents when
moral preferences about the scenario in question are strong. One other important observation
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Figure 5: Accuracy by heuristics for each scenario type in the Moral Machine dataset. Scenario
types describe scenarios experimentally designed to isolate a single moral factor (e.g. age) by
holding every other factor constant and randomly varying the free factor. Scenarios that do not
isolate a single factor are “Random.” Note that some heuristics do not have coverage in certain
scenario types; no bar is displayed for these cases.
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Figure 6: Rate of agreement between heuristic functions and Moral Machine respondents in the
validation set, sized by estimated weight. Accuracy is the proportion of responses for which the
heuristic (indicated by labels in the graph) chose the same alternative as the human respondent.
Coverage is the proportion of scenarios for which the heuristic did not abstain. Estimated
heuristic weights are computed without access to ground-truth.
about the performance of the heuristic functions is that for scenarios where many heuristics
abstained (“Age,” “Fitness,” “Gender,” “Social Status”), the resulting heuristic label matched
human responses less often. There are two likely explanations for this phenomenon: first, the
fact that accuracy tends to decrease with label density in general; second, the fact that fewer
moral factors were involved in these scenarios, putting the burden of decision-making on only
a few heuristics. The heuristic generative model tends to match human respondents more when
a diverse set of heuristics are applicable.
To assess the relative impact of each heuristic on predicted label accuracy and the robust-
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Figure 7: Label density in the validation set, smoothed with a multiplicative bandwidth adjust-
ment. The label density is the number of non-abstaining heuristic functions for a given moral
scenario.
ness of the label model to heuristic inclusion, I iteratively removed each heuristic function from
the model and compared the accuracy of the perturbed model to the baseline model with all
heuristic functions included (Figure 8). The accuracy gains are all relatively marginal, though
the stand-out heuristics with especially high accuracy and coverage from Figure 6 seem to add
the most predictive value. These heuristics also tend to match the effect sizes of respondents’
moral preferences [Awad et al., 2018].
5.1.4 Discriminative Model
After tuning the generative model, I trained a discriminative model to generalize beyond the
training to new dilemmas an autonomous vehicle might potentially encounter in the wild. The
discriminative model is a random forest binary classifier with 100 estimators, Gini split cri-
terion, no maximum depth, a minimum of two samples per split, and all remaining features
considered at each split. All classifiers in the following section were trained on the training
partition (424,419 examples) and tested on a separate test partition of 106,105 dilemmas pre-
sented to Moral Machine respondents.
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Figure 8: Negative accuracy loss after re-constructing the generative model without the given
heuristic. Accuracy gain is equivalent to the baseline model accuracy, with all heuristics in-
cluded, minus the perturbed model with the given heuristic removed.
Discriminative Model Accuracy. A baseline classifier trained on the ground-truth moral
decisions from human respondents Y achieved 69.6% accuracy. (Accuracy is an appropriate
measure of performance since the binary label is balanced.) To train a heuristic-based classifier
on the results from the generative model Y˜, I imputed the median for approximately 140,000
dilemmas with missing feature values. Additionally, I transformed the probabilistic labels
generated by the discriminative labels into binary labels by choosing the label with the highest
probability. In the case of a tie between labels, the predicted label is chosen randomly. This
transformation is lossy - a classifier which can interpret probabilistic targets is preferred (for
example, using a cross entropy loss function). Trained on the rounded labels, the heuristic-
based classifier achieves only 66.6% accuracy.
Accuracy Gain from Additional Respondents. There is no current benchmark for aggre-
gated accuracy on this dataset: Noothigattu et al. [2018] measure the correspondence of their
method with a voting-based outcome for a set of synthetic respondents, but not for the Moral
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Machine respondents because the dilemmas are randomly generated and responses cannot be
grouped. Kim et al. [2018] measure approximately 75% out-of-sample prediction accuracy
for their hierarchical Bayesian approach to learning moral preferences, predicting 128 respon-
dents’ final five decisions using a model fitted on their first eight. Figure 9 displays accuracy
measurements under the same experimental conditions as Kim et al. [2018], finding that de-
spite not accounting for individual variations in moral preference, the baseline classifier and
achieves only a marginally lower comparable accuracy (70.0%) trained on responses from 128
voters. This result is comparable with the accuracy of Kim et al. [2018]’s naive benchmark,
which does not account for group values. When trained on heuristic labels for the same scenar-
ios presented to those 128 voters, the classifier learns at the same rate, but scores approximately
5 points lower.
Figure 9: Discriminative model accuracy per number of respondents included in training, fitted
with a regression on the square root of the accuracy. Both models are trained on respondents’
first 8 scenarios and tested on their last 5 scenarios. Results are averaged across 10 trials;
the 95% confidence interval is extremely small and not shown. Smoothed fit line is a Loess
regression of accuracy on the training set size.
Learning Curve. How does each model perform when data is more scarce? I apply the full
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pipeline (running the heuristic functions over the training set, fitting the generative model, and
fitting the discriminative model) over a 5-fold shuffled partition of the entire dataset, scoring
the performance of a supervised classifier trained on ground-truth labels and a semi-supervised
classifier trained on the heuristic labels. Figure 10 shows the cross-validated accuracy scores
for each model plotted against the size of the training set. When human-labeled data is very
scarce, the two approaches perform nearly equally well. It is only after this point that the fully
supervised model begins to perform significantly better than the heuristic approach, suggesting
that the gains in accuracy from a fully-supervised approach only come into effect after a heavy
investment in manual labeling.
Figure 10: Discriminative model accuracy increase as the size of the training set is increased.
Accuracy is measured as the mean across a 5-fold cross-validation, where the generative model
and discriminative model are fitted on a training partition without access to a held-out test set.
Grey ribbons report the 95% confidence intervals for the two discriminative models measured,
supervised and semi-supervised (heuristic). Smoothed fit line is a Loess regression of accuracy
on the square root of the training set size.
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5.2 Kidney Exchange
Another domain in which an algorithm may be asked to make life-or-death moral decisions is
in market mechanism design, particularly for scarce resources. In kidney exchanges, a central
market clearing algorithm matches kidney donors to patients in need of an organ. Patients may
be prioritized according to a mixture of medical and moral criteria, in addition to the logistical
considerations of matching donors to kidneys.
5.2.1 Data
Freedman et al. [2020] develop an end-to-end method for estimating the moral weighting of
patient profiles for tie-breaking in a normal kidney exchange. To estimate the moral value of a
static set of 8 patient profiles, they survey 289 Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) users, who
are asked to allocate a kidney in a series of pairwise dilemmas. Each fictional patient is 30
or 60 years old, drinks alcohol rarely or frequently, and has no other health problems or has
skin cancer in remission. Each respondent was presented with all 28 pairwise contests, for a
total of 8,092 pairwise comparisons. There were no missing values. Each moral feature (age,
drinking, and health) was coded as a binary variable, where 0 represents lower age, infrequent
drinking, or no prior health conditions.
To assess the validity of a heuristic approach to moral decision-making in a different do-
main with fewer moral factors, I compare Freedman et al. [2020]’s approach with a model
trained on three simple heuristics: give kidneys to younger patients, patients who drink infre-
quently, and patients who do not have skin cancer in remission. These heuristics are sourced
from actual heuristics reported by the MTurk respondents, who were asked to explain the strat-
egy they used to decide which patient should receive the kidney. Once again, for the sake of
validation, I assume that the MTurk respondents are domain experts, though the advantage of
this approach is that only one or two experts may write heuristic functions that capture the
same moral knowledge as a large group of surveyed laypersons.
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Figure 11: Label density in the validation set. The label density is the number of non-abstaining
heuristic functions for a given moral scenario.
5.2.2 Heuristics & Label Model
Weight Estimation. Table 1 reports the coverage, accuracy, and estimated weight for each
heuristic. All three heuristics cover a similar majority of the scenarios, since each variable was
varied with equal frequency in the patient comparisons. Conflicts between the heuristics are
relatively common; each heuristic conflicts with another about 25% of the time. The density
of these labeling functions on these dilemmas is reported in Figure 11; nearly every point has
one or two votes. Notably, the generative model does little to discriminate between the three
heuristics - the estimated weights are nearly identical (Table 1). As a result, a majority vote
labeler performs just as well as the generative model does, both models agreeing with the
MTurk respondents 80.2% of the time.
Heuristic % Coverage % Accuracy Estimated Weight
Choose younger patient 60.5 83.2 0.602
Choose patient who drinks less 56.8 78.8 0.594
Choose patient with no other
health issues
56.4 61.0 0.600
Table 1: Coverage, accuracy, and estimated weight parameters for a simple set of moral heuris-
tics for the kidney exchange. Accuracy refers to the heuristic’s agreement with surveyed MTurk
respondents.
Generative Model Accuracy. As displayed in Figure 12, the generative model agrees
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with human respondents for nearly all scenarios with only one isolated moral factor, but dis-
agrees more frequently about interactions between two or more variables. Notably, the heuris-
tic “choose the patient who drinks less” suffers very little loss in accuracy when applied to
situations where only level of drinking is varied versus situations where both prior health con-
ditions and drinking are varied. In random scenarios, “choose patient with no other health
issues” performs barely better than a coin flip, but in scenarios where only health is varied
performs vary well. This may suggest that participants only resort to heuristics about prior
health conditions when no other differences are present and a choice must be made.
Figure 12: Accuracy by heuristics for each comparison type in the kidney exchange case study.
Scenario types describe scenarios experimentally designed to isolate a single moral factor (e.g.
age) by holding every other factor constant and randomly varying the free factor. Some scenar-
ios isolate multiple factors, or all the factors at once (“Random” scenarios). All tested scenarios
fall into one of these types. Note that some heuristics do not have coverage in certain scenario
types; no bar is displayed for these cases.
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5.2.3 Discriminative Model
Discriminative Model Accuracy. Using the survey data to estimate a moral preferences for
each possible patient profile, Freedman et al. [2020] adjust the kidney exchange algorithm to
simply choose the patient whose profile commands the higher normalized moral preference in
the case of a tie. This strategy is not generalizable; Freedman et al. [2020] do not specify a
way to calculate moral weights for new patient profiles or new moral factors. Further, their
strategy requires a large number of responses for every combination of patient profiles, on the
order of n2 comparisons if n is the number of possible patient profiles in the exchange pool.
It would be difficult to gather enough survey data to estimate moral preferences for that many
pairwise comparisons, especially if more moral factors or more factor levels are added and the
number of possible patient profiles grows. But for a small problem space like the one in this
example, Freedman et al. [2020]’s strategy (choosing the patient profile with higher estimated
preference) agrees with the MTurk respondents just as often as a supervised classifier, about
86% of the time (Figure 13). My weakly supervised approach also performs remarkably well,
agreeing with respondents 81.1% of the time. Figure 13 shows the learning curves for each
method.
Accuracy Gain from Additional Respondents. In the kidney exchange example, the
model tends to learn less from additional respondents than in the Moral Machine example
(14); in fact, the learning curve looks very similar to the learning curve for additional training
data. Perhaps this is evidence that the variance of individual moral preferences is lower in the
kidney exchange use case, either because respondents naturally agreed more about morality
for each example or because the number of moral features is fewer.
5.2.4 Ranked-Choice Heuristics
Because the kidney exchange data included free-form responses from respondents about the
strategies they used to choose kidney recipients, I conducted an additional experiment in which
the presence of heuristics in respondents’ reported strategies was used inform the heuristics’
weight in the generative step. In this way, additional information about the accuracy of each
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Figure 13: Discriminative model accuracy increase as the size of the training set is increased.
Accuracy is measured as the mean across a 10-fold cross-validation, where the generative
model and discriminative model are fitted on a training partition without access to a held-out
test set. Grey ribbons report the 95% confidence intervals for the two discriminative mod-
els measured, supervised and semi-supervised (heuristic). Note that the weights are not re-
calculated for each training set - rather, the baseline is a fixed set of weights. Smoothed fit line
is a Loess regression of accuracy on the square root of the training set size.
heuristic can be used to augment or supplant the weights estimated by the generative model.
Heuristic Rankings. At the end of the kidney exchange experiment, users were asked
to describe in words the reasoning behind their moral choices. Most respondents’ strategies
can be categorized as one of the three heuristics specified in my model or its direct opposite.
Each user tended to respond in a ranked fashion: e.g., “I always chose the younger patient; if
both patients were the same age, then I chose the one who drank less.” I manually coded each
response into a ranking of heuristics (ties allowed); for the example above, the coded ranking
is 1) choose younger patient; 2) choose patient who drinks less; 3) all other strategies and their
opposites. I ignored respondents who did not provide a strategy or whose strategies did not
directly match or directly contradict one of the three heuristics used in the generative model
(there were 35 such respondents). Table 2 reports the Borda counts for these coded strategies;
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Figure 14: Discriminative model accuracy increase as the size of the training set is increased.
Accuracy is measured as the mean across a 10-fold cross-validation, where the generative
model, discriminative model, and Borda weights are fitted on a training partition without access
to a held-out test set. Grey ribbons report the 95% confidence intervals for the two discrimi-
native models measured, supervised and semi-supervised (heuristic). Note that the weights are
not re-calculated for each training set - rather, the baseline is a fixed set of weights. Smoothed
fit line is a Loess regression of accuracy on the square root of the training set size.
Heuristic Avg. Borda Count
Choose older patient 0.11
Choose younger patient 3.42
Choose patient who drinks more 0.04
Choose patient who drinks less 2.71
Choose patient with other health issues 0.19
Choose patient with no other health issues 2.10
Table 2: Mean Borda count for each heuristic and its contradiction. Borda counts are calculated
from manual ranked choice coding of text responses. (The Borda count for a given alternative
is equal to the number of other alternatives ranked below it in a participant’s survey response.)
Ties are permitted.
the Borda counts can be interpreted as a popularity ranking of the strategies among the survey
respondents.
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Weighted Majority Model Accuracy. Imagining that the MTurk respondents are domain
experts, the popularity of a given heuristic strategy may be used to inform which heuristics
are given priority when their outputs are aggregated into a single label. As a simple proof-
of-concept, I modify the majority voting model to use weights when tallying the votes from
each heuristic function. (In other words, each heuristic function is allocated a certain number
of votes according to its popularity amongst the survey respondents. The labels produced by
more popular heuristics have greater influence over the final, aggregate label produced by the
weighted majority voter.) The voting weights are just the Borda counts scaled from 0 to 1.
This weighted majority voting model, which boosts popular heuristics, agrees with MTurk
respondents a remarkable 5.1% more often than either the generative model (Section 4.3) or
an unweighted majority vote model. Figure 12 also shows the performance of the weighted
majority voter per comparison type; all of the gain in accuracy comes from scenarios where
two moral factors are varied, such as Age & Health.
Weighted Majority Learning Curve. Figure 14 shows the learning curve for weak su-
pervision with each label model type (weighted majority, unweighted majority, or generative)
alongside a directly supervised classifier. Here, weights were calculated only using the mean
Borda count of the n respondents included in the training set. The approach learns at a much
quicker rate per number of respondents in the training set than even the fully-supervised clas-
sifier, and achieves the same equilibrium accuracy. While this strategy may not work for a use
case where heuristics are too complicated or contingent to be easily ranked, it is especially ef-
fective for simple uses cases like this one. Rather than providing 28 pairwise choices, experts
could simply vote on a set of candidate heuristics.
6 Discussion
Broadly, weakly supervised learning combines the “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches to
moral decision-making. This approach significantly reduces the costs associated with obtain-
ing large sets of high-quality labels while retaining out-of-sample accuracy. Sourcing moral
principles from experts provides advantages for customizing domain-specific algorithms with-
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out requiring the rigid, disjunctive set of rules need to code a game-theoretic model; it is
unreasonable to assume that a set of non-conflicting moral principles can be obtained for any
sufficiently complex moral problem, and heuristic functions are expected to overlap and con-
flict. My approach does not attempt to create a unified moral theory; rather, experts can provide
just as much heuristic information as they have about the domain without attempting to gener-
alize beyond their contingent experience; in this way, moral expertise from multiple specialists
can be combined to create an efficient moral decision-maker across the entire domain. Addi-
tionally, in the fully-supervised case, domain experts have no way to express uncertainty in
their moral decisions. In semi-supervision, probabilistic labels confer the relative uncertainty
of the heuristics about a given moral decision to the discriminative model, which makes the
final, discrete decision based on generalizations across multiple, uncertain labels.
My approach also has the logistical advantage of interfacing with machine learning at the
training phase. Rather than adding a new suite of moral models to their machine learning
pipelines, practitioners can use existing classification techniques trained on the combined la-
bels provided by experts’ moral heuristics. For the purposes of interpretability, the output of
the label model can be accounted for by examining the individual votes of each heuristic func-
tion. Interpretations at the discriminative step must be obtained using existing interpretability
methods, or a naturally interpretable classifier (such as a decision tree) [Du et al., 2018].
The experiments performed in Section 5 show that while heuristics derived from measured
moral preferences do not always agree with survey respondents, a weakly-supervised machine
learning approach can make comparable moral decisions with no crowdsourcing whatsoever.
Though this paper uses crowd-sourced data to prove the efficacy of my method, this approach
does not require massive data collection. In a real-world example, a set of experts need only
provide a set of heuristics and a small development set of hand-labeled dilemmas for valida-
tion. For simpler domains, I show that finding a small set of popular heuristics and asking
respondents to rank those heuristics may be a viable alternative to collecting a full set of pair-
wise comparisons, and may in fact capture more information about the relative certainty of
respondents’ moral decisions. Surveys may not be even necessary; one potential application
of this approach is to search an external knowledge base, such as a body of law, for heuristics
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relevant to a given moral dilemma and write heuristics using those legal principles. Ethical
recommendations, commonly carefully constructed and released by watchdogs, also constitute
a fruitful source of moral heuristics [Luetge, 2017].
Theoretically, this approach is not limited to cheaply replicating the preferences of experts,
scholars, lawyers, and crowds. Heuristics are especially useful for breaking down complex
problems into sub-problems that can be solved with shortcuts or approximations. As a proof-
of-concept, this investigation was limited to domains where moral preference data already
exists. I hope that future work will attempt to elicit and validate heuristics from domain experts
to solve a real-world moral dilemma in more complex domains without easily measured moral
preferences. In these domains, the heuristic approach may be the only viable framework for
making moral decisions.
However, there are still important problems to solve before moral decision-making algo-
rithms are truly reliable. First, the problem of representation is ignored; heuristic functions
can only operate on a set of measurable, observable features selected by domain engineers to
have moral status. This framework mitigates the representation problem by relying on experts,
who may be informed enough to handle extremely detailed feature sets, but representations
may still aggressively reduce the dilemma at hand. Hierarchical feature representations might
provide a useful interface for combining the expertise of individuals in different fields of a
particular domain; an expert might be able to specify very granular heuristics for one set of
features, but may only be able to express broad heuristics for less-familiar areas of the feature
space.
Second, experts must be selected carefully; issues of selection bias and small sample sizes
could create poorly specified heuristic functions or systematically disadvantage underrepre-
sented groups. For example, the best-performing heuristic writers in a Snorkel workshop were
individuals with an M.S. or a Ph.D. and strong Python coding skills [Ratner et al., 2017]. To
incorporate multiple perspectives, some level of translation between domain experts without a
high level of education and coding skill is required. Oversight is also important for account-
ability; future work should focus on designing human-in-the-loop workflows for interpreting
moral decisions and adjusting heuristics accordingly. In general, the risk of systematic error
34
increases as fewer perspectives are consulted; but crowd-sourcing is not the only way to solve
this problem, as I demonstrate with the ranked-choice experiment. Crucially, this framework
depends wholly on the moral expertise of the heuristic writers and their ability to represent the
interests of stakeholders in the domain. In other words, if a crowdsourcing approach is demo-
cratic and a “top-down” approach is totalitarian, then this approach relies on a representative
democracy to reach acceptable moral outcomes, with all the ensuing trade-offs.
Perhaps the most useful avenue of future work is the incorporation of moral heuristics with
amoral or domain-specific optimization objectives. This investigation deals only with isolated
moral dilemmas, in which the moral decision has been isolated from other optimizations in
the problem. (For instance, in the kidney exchange, moral decisions are made only in the
case of a tie; moral factors are not considered in the rest of the matching algorithm.) But
because this framework operates at the labeling stage, it could be integrated as a secondary or
superseding label ground-truth during training. With a set of moral heuristics, an autonomous
vehicle might act differently if it encountered a deer in the road than it would if it encountered
some inanimate obstacle.
7 Conclusion
Heuristics provide a means to specify ethical positions for especially complex, high-dimensional
dilemmas and allow analysis of more complicated quandaries. By lowering costs and adding
domain expertise, this framework dramatically lowers the barriers to incorporating ethical prin-
ciples in practical applications. Moreover, weak supervision paves the way to a ubiquitous
method for instilling ethical principles in learning algorithms.
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